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I. INTRODUCTION 
STEPHEN R. MILLER* 
This collection of essays arose from presentations made by participants at the 
inaugural meeting of the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West held at the Sun Valley 
Lodge in Ketchum, Idaho, on November 13th and 14th, 2014. The topic chosen for this 
first Symposium was Transmission and Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. and 
Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map. The topic was purposefully large in scope, 
engaging as many energy sectors and as much of the western U.S. and Canada as possible. 
The proceedings of this meeting, in turn, will inform future meetings of the Symposium 
series that will focus on more defined, particularized aspects of western energy 
production and use. 
The Symposium began with two panels that explored energy infrastructural choices 
that the western U.S. and Canada currently face. Sam Kalen, University of Wyoming 
College of Law, spoke on law’s role in embedding choices in the energy landscape, as 
well as the nature of a resilient legal architecture necessary to facilitate today’s low-
carbon preferences. Tara Righetti, also of the University of Wyoming College of Law, 
then discussed flaring rules related to natural gas exploration in the west. She also 
discussed how those changes may influence the expansion of natural gas transportation 
and storage infrastructures in the west. K.K. Duvivier, Sturm College of Law, University 
of Denver, discussed several problems related to the distribution of wind resources and 
proposed several solutions. Troy Rule, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona 
State University, offered thoughts on utilities and the market for rooftop solar generation. 
Don Howell, chief legal counsel for the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, discussed one 
state’s complications in integrating renewables into its energy portfolio. 
The Symposium then turned to a discussion of the potential impacts of the Clean 
Air Act section 111(d) Clean Power Plan, which was led by Melissa Powers, Lewis and 
Clark Law School. Issues raised in Prof. Powers’ session were continued in the 
Symposium’s afternoon sessions, which were dedicated to western regional energy 
planning. Three attorneys from the Green Energy Institute at the Lewis and Clark Law 
School presented on a variety of energy planning issues. Nick Lawton discussed 
promoting renewable energy development on public lands; Amelia Schlusser discussed 
the Clean Power Plan’s implications for the western grid; and Nate Larsen discussed how 
utility reforms in Hawaii and New York could ultimately have implications on the 
Northwest’s electricity industry. 
The theme of western regional energy planning was continued into the 
Symposium’s last panel. John Fazio, a senior power systems analyst for the Northwest 
Power and Conservation Council, discussed the Council’s current progress on the 
Seventh Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan. David Solan, Boise State 
University, discussed the creation of energy imbalance markets across the western United 
States. 
All of the Symposium’s presentations were live-streamed on the Internet and have 
been archived on the Symposium website where they may be viewed for free.1 The essays 
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that follow are presented in the order of the authors’ presentations at the Symposium, and 
thus roughly move through the Symposium’s major themes of energy infrastructure 
choices and western regional energy planning. Collectively, these essays provide a 
notable introduction to leading issues facing western energy law today. 
A brief word is due on the nature of the Symposium. The Idaho Symposium on 
Energy in the West is a new interdisciplinary collaboration between the University of 
Idaho College of Law Natural Resources and Environmental Law Program; the Center 
for Advanced Energy Studies at Idaho National Laboratories; and the Energy Policy 
Institute at Boise State University. The three collaborating institutions plan to hold a 
meeting of the Symposium series on an annual basis with the hope of providing a new 
intellectual resource for energy law and policy in the west. In even years, it is anticipated 
that the Symposium will be a large, public-facing event suitable for scholars, industry 
professionals, and practicing lawyers. In odd years, the Symposium is anticipated to 
convene as a smaller, scholarly event with the goal of providing a collaborative 
environment to advance law and policy scholarship on energy issues. The next 
Symposium meeting is planned for Spring, 2016. 
Finally, many thanks go to my co-organizer of the Symposium series, Barbara 
Cosens, University of Idaho College of Law, who has proven a valuable mentor in this 
and other projects over the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Contributors’ Note:  Funding for the Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West was generously provided 
by the Center for Advanced Energy Studies at Idaho National Laboratory (CAES).  In particular, thanks go 
to Dr. Steven Aumeier, Director of Energy Systems and Technologies, Idaho National Laboratory, and 
Michael Hagood, Director, Program Development, Energy and Environment Science and Technology, Idaho 
National Laboratory, both of whom gave generously of their time in framing this event, as well as the 
Symposium series generally.  Many at the University of Idaho were essential to the Symposium’s success.  
Foremost among them is Jack McIver, Vice President for Research at the University of Idaho, who assisted 
in procuring funds for the Symposium and also provided administrative assistance from his office.  At the 
University of Idaho, College of Law, the creation of the Symposium spanned the tenure of three deans—
former Dean Donald Burnett, Interim Dean Michael Satz, and current Dean Mark Adams—each of whom 
supported the Symposium’s creation in spirit and also by providing administrative resources from the College.  
Thanks also go to Dr. David Solan, Assistant Professor, Boise State University Department of Public Policy 
and Administration and Director of the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University, for his assistance in 
framing the discussion.  Many thanks go to Eric White and Eric Fredback at the University of Idaho, as well 
as Donna Wuthrich at CAES, each of whom provided tremendous administrative, accounting, and technical 
assistance in helping three institutions work together for the first time.  Finally, thanks go to the staff at the 
Sun Valley Lodge—and, in particular, Tayt Knowles and Michael Hoover—who assisted us in hosting a 
terrific event despite the unexpected blizzard that accompanied this first meeting of the Symposium series. 
1. Idaho Symposium on Energy in the West, UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, 
http://www.uidaho.edu/law/news/upcoming-events/energy-in-the-west (last visited Ocotober 25, 2015). 
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II. EMBEDDED CHOICES: A RESILIENT ENERGY LEGAL ARCHITECTURE 
SAM KALEN** 
Fortune Magazine, in 1955, included an array of projections for what our society 
might look like by 1980: One projection was that homes might be powered by atomic 
units, with energy virtually free—suggested no less by the then head of the atomic energy 
commission. A little over ten years ago, our dialogues focused on peak oil and the need 
for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG); today, policy-makers talk about exports, for 
oil, coal, and LNG. In just a few short years, crude-by-rail has gone from being barely 
mentioned to almost a crisis conversation to address too many train accidents.2 Within 
roughly a decade and half, as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling has opened up 
natural gas resources across the country, the natural gas industry has witnessed the rise 
of the midstream transportation company—without a corresponding structure to ensure 
the safety of these new lines.3 Energy, in short, is not just fluid; it is exceedingly dynamic 
and unpredictable. When, therefore, we engage in a dialogue about “Transmission and 
Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. & Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map to 
2050,”4 the subject of this symposium, we first ought to appreciate how choices in our 
laws might become embedded and yet inconsistent with the dynamic nature of energy 
markets and technology. 
This short essay, consequently, suggests that our existing legal architecture lacks 
the resilience necessary to respond effectively to a dynamic energy market and emerging 
technologies. It briefly reviews how some of those choices have unfolded in the past, how 
the conversations today recognize that we lack a capable architecture, and then why the 
dialogues of today focus too much on either specifics or theory rather than constructing 
a resilient legal architecture for the future. 
Our ability to establish workable structures capable of accommodating an ever-
changing economy and technology has proven remarkably poor. The Supreme Court and 
Congress developed legal structures by looking in a rear view mirror, with little 
appreciation for how quickly or in what manner changes might occur in the road ahead. 
                                                          
 ** Winston Howard Distinguished Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. The 
author would like to thank the participants at the symposium for their helpful questions and comments. 
 
 2. See High Prairie Pipeline, LLC v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 149 FERC P 61,004, 61,013 
(Oct. 1, 2014) (stating that crude-by-rail is an analogue of what some claim is a problem with the 
administration of crude oil pipelines under the Interstate Commerce Act and the inability of some companies 
to transport their produce over third party lines); Spate of Oil Train Accidents May Up Pressure on White 
House, GREENWIRE (Feb. 27, 2015) 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060014172/search?keyword=spate+of+oil+train+accidents; see 
also Jad Mouawad, Bakken Crude, Rolling Through Albany, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/business/energy-environment/bakkan-crude-rolling-through-
albany.html?_r=0 
 3. See Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,086, 53,086–88 
(Aug. 25, 2011); see also U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-667, OIL AND GAS 
TRANSPORTATION: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IS TAKING ACTIONS TO ADDRESS RAIL SAFETY, BUT 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE PIPELINE SAFETY (2014) (noting growing risk of federally 
unregulated gathering pipelines); THE INGAA FOUNDATION, INC., NORTH AMERICAN MIDSTREAM 
INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: CAPITALIZING ON OUR ENERGY ABUNDANCE (2014) (discussing growth 
of midstream infrastructure). 
 4. The symposium topic corresponds well with the First of the President’s Quadrennial Energy 
Review, pursuant to the January 9, 2014 Presidential Memorandum, on “Energy Transmission, Storage, and 
Distribution.” 
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When the Supreme Court first established, during the pre-New Deal era, seemingly easily 
identifiable spheres of jurisdiction between state and federal authority,5 neither the 
assumptions about the nature of electricity nor the market would survive more than 
another few decades.6 The 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act,7 responding to a 
perceived failure of the market to arrest market concentration by natural monopolies, 
ultimately impeded the development of innovative and progressive utilities, a problem 
well understood by the 1980s but not fully corrected until the Energy Policy Act of 2005.8 
The energy crisis of the 1970s prompted an array of discrete programs, collectively 
referred to as President Carter’s National Energy Policy, but it too was far from a national 
energy policy and lacked sufficient consistency with emerging environmental principles.9 
Congress, for instance, passed the National Gas Policy Act of 1978,10 with an assumption 
that proved inaccurate only to be corrected by the Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989.11 
Each of these programs and others created embedded choices that cabined innovation and 
flexibility. 
We again are on the cusp of pretending that our legal institutions are prescient 
enough to craft sufficiently precise rules to carry our energy economy forward for longer 
than a few years. The undeniable urgency of transitioning to a low carbon economy has 
produced a fugue of commentary on how to incorporate renewable energy resources into 
the electric grid,12 but, as with the debate now between Tesla’s electric car and Toyota’s 
push for hydrogen fuel cell cars,13 it seems foolhardy to believe that our legal institutions 
have the capacity to canvass existing R&D programs and calculate which ones will 
succeed. After all, it is almost universally accepted that, if battery storage on a large and 
reliable scale emerges, our energy markets and structure could be altered significantly. 
Yet, the current dialogue about the electric grid appears poised to establish a suite 
of embedded choices that may, or may not, promote a low carbon, low cost, flexible, and 
reliable grid. To begin with, the jurisdictional paradigm from the Federal Power Act 
allocating authority between the states and the federal government is marginally 
                                                          
 5. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927). In 
response, Congress passed the 1935 Federal Power Act, amending the 1920 Federal Water Power Act. Public 
Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). 
 6. See generally STEPHEN BREYER & PAUL MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL 
POWER COMMISSION (1974) (stating that by the 1950s and 1960s, the need for regional coordination 
(including power pools) and interconnection—almost dictating a shift toward necessary federal control—
emerged). 
 7. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79–79z (repealed 2005). 
 8. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
 9. See Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a National Resource Policy, 19 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 9, 13 (2005). 
 10. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (which sought to correct 
the resulting effects of the Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), 
extending federal control over producer wellhead sales for resale of natural gas flowing into the interstate 
market). 
 11. Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989). 
 12. See, e.g., Symposium, Greening the Grid: Building a Legal Framework for Carbon Neutrality, 
39 ENVTL. L. 927 (2009); see also Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC 
Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2014); Albert C. Lin, Lessons from the 
Past for Assessing Energy Technologies for the Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1814 (2014). 
 13. Drew Harwell, Meet the Fast-Charging, Affordable ‘Future’ Car That Elon Musk Hates, 
WASH. POST., Feb. 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/02/25/meet-the-
fast-charging-affordable-future-car-that-elon-musk-hates/. 
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workable.14 States, such as those impacted by Hurricane Sandy, want to ensure that they 
have sufficient say in capacity markets (available electric generation), and are now 
engaged in a dialogue with the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) about 
their ability to intrude into areas FERC considers within its domain.15 Similarly, issues 
associated with allocating authority over the administration of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 are once again surfacing with increasing frequency as 
smaller renewable energy resources push to come on line.16 And perhaps, more 
importantly, it is not yet settled whether FERC or the states can require demand response 
(efficiency in the grid by downstream consumers).17 Considerable scholarly commentary, 
therefore, favors the need for new governance structures that would smooth the 
jurisdictional divide between the states and the federal government.18 
But such a dialogue assumes that we know whether a national, regional, or local 
generation and distribution market is best suited for future technologies. Admittedly, with 
the advent of regional transmission organizations and independent system operators,19 
along with FERC supervised reliability standards and the importance of balancing 
authorities for the grid (and push toward organized markets),20 we may well have 
established sufficiently embedded choices favoring a regionally structured governance 
model. That, in turn, for example, could impede the penetration of distributed generation. 
For instance, in California, proponents of distributed solar generation suggest that the 
emergence of the large-scale utility solar projects unwisely perpetuates the old energy 
model of large generation resources situated away from the load.21 
                                                          
 14. An excellent survey of the issues was presented during the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies conference on “Electricity in Transition: Technology, Markets and Regulation,” Sept. 4, 2014. 
 15. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting 
Maryland’s program for encouraging new capacity in the wholesale market); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. 
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3rd Cir. 2014) (rejecting New Jersey’s attempt to encourage new capacity into 
wholesale market); CPV Shore, L.L.C., 148 FERC P 61,096, 61554 (Aug. 5, 2014) (rejecting agreements as 
intruding upon FERC authority); Final Initial Brief of Petitioners People of the State of New York and the 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the State of New York, New York v. FERC, No. 13-2316, (2nd Cir. 2014) 
(distinguishing between jurisdictional local distribution facilities and FERC jurisdictional bulk power 
transmission facilities). 
 16. See Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2014); Allco Fin. Ltd. 
v. Klee, No. 15-20, 2015 WL 6774324 (2nd Cir. Nov. 6, 2015) (involving question of whether state attempt 
to promote renewable resources intrudes on FERC’s authority); see also Midland Power Coop. v. FERC, 774 
F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction fight over interconnection of a wind developer). 
The scheduling of small renewable resources has become an issue in the northwest, as well. See PaTu Wind 
Farm Takes PGE to FERC Over Transmission Scheduling, CLEARING UP, No. 1671 (Nov. 7, 2014). 
 17. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015). The D.C. Circuit held that FERC’s effort to promote demand response 
intruded upon state authority, a conclusion that the Obama Administration believes “seriously misinterpreted” 
federal authority. Hannah Northey, White House Seeks Supreme Court Review of Demand Response Case, 
GREENWIRE (Jan. 16, 2015). See generally Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing 
Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 (2014); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the 
Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 
SAN. DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2012–13). 
 18. E.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 19. See FERC, Regional Transmission Org., 89 FERC P 61,285 (1999). See also Regional 
Transmission Org. (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Sept. 29, 2015).  
 20. See Malcolm McLellan & Carol Opatrny, Maintaining a Balance: Innovation in Power 
System Balancing Authorities, 1 WASH. J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2011). 
 21. E.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012); cf. Edward Klump, 
Even as Grid Persists, EEI Speakers Say Utilities’ Approach Must Evolve, E&E NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), 
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What I suggest we need, instead, is not another attempt to construct legal 
institutions or structures (what I have been calling our legal architecture) based upon 
present choices, current technologies, or the market as we envision it today, particularly 
with one of the nation’s top energy experts suggesting how the nation’s utilities must 
change dramatically,22 but rather a fundamental shift in the conversation. The 
conversation should focus on developing an adaptive, or resilient, legal architecture that 
enjoys sufficient capacity to permit clean, efficient, and reliable markets and technologies 
to develop. Just as computer systems gravitated toward an open architecture, we need to 
explore how to craft our next wave of energy legislation in a manner that will promote, 
not retard, our shift toward a low carbon energy economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/11/13/stories/1060008812 (noting speakers’ claims that utilities 
will need to change, but that distributed generation will be a part of the grid). See generally AMORY B. 
LOVINS, REINVENTING FIRE: BOLD BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 202–09 (2011); Sara 
C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010).   
 22. Peter Behr, Power Industry on ‘Train Wreck’ Path, Consultant Says, E&E NEWS (Sept. 4, 
2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/09/04/stories/1060005204 (describing comments of Peter 
Fox-Penner of the Brattle Group). 
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III. AVOIDABLY LOST23: EVOLVING THE REASONABLE USE STANDARD TO 
REDUCE NATURAL GAS FLARING 
TARA RIGHETTI*** 
In unconventional plays throughout the United States, flaring has become 
ubiquitous as a means to dispose produced gas that cannot be efficiently gathered and 
transported to market.24 The result is waste, lost value, and unnecessary emissions.25 The 
distributed nature of unconventional resources, lack of portability of gas, and lower value 
compared to oil present challenges to infrastructure investment and contribute to the 
widespread utilization of flaring.26 These challenges are compounded by the uncertainty 
and cost associated with obtaining right of way for gathering lines from surface 
landowners. 
Gas production requires a capillary like system through which gas can be gathered, 
compressed, processed, and delivered to an intrastate or interstate line or point of sale.27 
Development of this type of gathering infrastructure is particularly problematic on split-
estates, where property ownership of the surface and minerals is divided.28 The mineral 
estate is considered “dominant” and the lessee has an implied right to use as much of the 
surface as is reasonably necessary to explore for and produce the minerals and give 
purpose to the grant.29 There is no prescribed list of what uses are reasonably necessary: 
reasonableness is determined as a question of fact considering custom, use, and practice 
in the industry.30 Over time, this standard has evolved in response to changes in 
technology and regulation.31 
                                                          
 23. The title comes from Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and 
Gas Leases (NTL 4-A) U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Jan. 1, 1980) 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/ak/aktest/energy/og_forms.Par.32669.File.dat/ntl4a.pdf. I do not 
suggest that gas flared for lack of infrastructure or right of way should be considered avoidably lost for 
purposes of determining royalty.  
 
 *** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. 
 
 24. In 2013, forty percent of the natural gas vented or flared in the United States was in North 
Dakota, much of it from oil wells in the unconventional Bakken formation. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals 
and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_vgv_mmcf_a.htm; North Dakota Natural Gas Vented 
and Flared, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9040nd2m.htm. 
 25. Ryan Salmon & Andrew Logan, Flaring Up: North Dakota Natural Gas More than Doubles 
in Two Years, CERES (2013), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/flaring-up-north-dakota-natural-gas-
flaring-more-than-doubles-in-two-years/view. “In 2012 alone, flaring resulted in the loss of approximately 
$1 billion in fuel and the GHG emissions equivalent of adding one million cars to the road.” Id. at 3. 
 26. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure 
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 951 (2014). 
 27. Kevin A. Lawlor & Michael Conder, Gathering and Processing Design Options for 
Unconventional Gas, MIDSTREAM BUS. (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.midstreambusiness.com/gathering-and-processing-design-options-unconventional-gas-222956.  
 28. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1245 (D. Wyo. 
2005).  
 29. 4 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS, § 40:4 (3d ed.) (2014); Pulaski Oil Co. 
v. Conner, 162 P. 464, 464 (Okla. 1916). This right is limited in many states by the accommodation doctrine, 
which can require the mineral owner to use a less impactful alternative if one reasonably exists. 
 30. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals §§ 214, 290; Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 
555 (Miss. 1962). 
 31. See generally Michelle Andrea Wenzel, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development 
Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607; WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK 
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Dominance, however, has its limits.32 Where both the surface and minerals are 
privately owned,33 courts have restricted the mineral owner’s implied easement to include 
only those uses reasonably necessary to access the minerals directly underlying the 
surface parcel.34 Certain field-wide infrastructure, such as wastewater disposal or 
leadlines carrying off-lease production, has been found to be excessive.35 Lessees are also 
prohibited in most situations from using eminent domain to construct gathering 
infrastructure.36 Accordingly, lessees must secure a right of way from surface owners to 
build gathering lines.37 This process is time-consuming, involves high transaction costs, 
and encourages strategic opportunism by surface owners, during which time gas is flared, 
energy is lost, and air pollutants are emitted. 38 
The marketing of production is necessarily incident to the lessee’s ability to carry 
out its rights under the lease.39 If gas can only be economically marketed through a shared 
gathering system, the mineral owner’s right to surface use should evolve accordingly. 
Similar to the right of lessees to dispose of off-lease water as part of secondary recovery 
operations, this interpretation of the reasonable use standard would increase production 
and reduce the expense of lease operations.40 This change is essential in that the mineral 
producer would be considered to have the right to build gathering lines as part of 
developing its asset, and thus no easement would be required.41 
Adopting this approach would reduce uncertainty and encourage investment by 
reducing barriers to private ordering and providing alternative remedies at law. Producers 
could post bond for surface damages or to obtain an injunction or sue for damages 
resulting from unreasonable delay. Several producing states have split estate laws that 
provide the mineral developer with the ability move forward by posting bond when 
                                                          
& DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 460 (West Group, 3d ed. 2000) (“[T]he purposes may keep 
up with those changes that might be reasonably anticipated for the dominant tenement—evolutionary but not 
revolutionary changes”). 
 32. Kendor P. Jones et al., Split Estates and Surface Access Issues, LANDMAN’S LEGAL 
HANDBOOK 181 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2013). 
 33. Development of pooled, communitized, or unitized minerals may differ. See Entek GRB, LLC 
v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014); Key Operating & Equip. Inc. v. Hegar, 435 
S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. 2014). 
 34. Russell v. Tex. Co., 238 F.2d 636, 644 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 35. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App. 1987) (noting that “the gas 
purchaser would not have the right to transport any other gas in the line across the surface owner’s land 
without condemnation proceedings or an easement from the owner of the surface estate”); Gill v. McCollum, 
311 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that disposal of wastewater from off-lease was not 
permitted because the injection “must have some relation to the primary purpose of obtaining production”). 
 36. Valerie Chambers et al., Eminent Domain in Oil and Gas: Tax Treatment When a Pipeline 
Devalues Surrounding Property, 23 S. L.J. 225, 232 (2003). 
 37. Bruce Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, Severed 
Minerals, Split Estates, Rights of Access, and Surface Use in Mineral Extraction Operations 2-1 (2005), 
reprinted in 44 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. J. 273 (2007). 
 38. See Industry to Increase Natural Gas Capture to 85 Percent Within Two Years and 90 Percent 
in Six Years, N. DAKOTA PETROLEUM COUNCIL (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.ndoil.org/latest-news/news-
release-industry-to-increase-natural-gas-capture-to-85-percent-within-two-years-and-90-percent-in-six-
years/. 
 39. Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. App. 1992). 
 40. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 446 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a lessee/operator has the right 
to bring off-lease salt water on to the leased premises to increase production via injection).  
 41. Christopher S. Kulander, Surface Damages, Site-Remediation and Well Bonding in 
Wyoming—Results and Analysis of Recent Regulation, 9 WYO. L. REV. 413, 421 (2009). 
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negotiations fail.42 Bonding-on is limited to uses considered within the scope of the 
implied right of access.43 As such, gathering facilities do not necessarily qualify for 
bonding-on or arbitration provisions under those laws. Even in states without split-estate 
laws, a surface owner can be liable for damages, such as standby rig time, resulting from 
its obstruction of the mineral owner’s reasonable surface use.44 Were gathering lines 
considered within the scope of the implied easement, mineral owners could pursue claims 
for the lost value of flared gas and for any fines, penalties, or royalty assessed on flared 
gas during the period of delay. While mineral lessees rarely avail themselves of these 
remedies,45 the possibility may reduce uncertainty and deter strategic behavior. 
Protecting the private property rights of the surface owner against unreasonable use 
remains critical. Expanding the scope of the easement does not obviate the custom, or 
requirement under most split-estate acts, to compensate the surface owner for damages.46 
Allowing off-lease production to cross the land justifiably expands the scope of the 
limited easement granted to the mineral owner,47 and compensation could be 
correspondingly increased. The nexus between the use and underlying minerals must also 
be preserved: where the property is not included in an exploratory unit, any gathering line 
crossing the property would have to carry some gas produced from parcel. To do 
otherwise would risk the surface owner being subject to any use that conceivably 
improved the economics of the entire operations of the producer, without necessarily 
relating to the dominant parcel itself. 
Flaring and venting that results from failures in private ordering to allow 
construction of gathering lines demonstrates the limitations of the current implied 
easement for mineral development to address the realities associated with unconventional 
and dispersed resources. It is necessary to preserve the flexibility of the mineral owner’s 
rights of access to absorb evolutionary changes in response to new resources and new 
technologies or to provide alternate means of obtaining access through eminent domain. 
If we fail to do so, we can be certain that energy will continue to be avoidably lost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 42. Id. at 426. 
 43. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402 (2014).  
 44. See generally Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1980); Montfort v. Trek Res., Inc., 198 
S.W.3d 344 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 45. A review of split estate bonds posted in Wyoming since passage of the split estate act indicates 
that mineral developers bond-on in less than two percent of wells permitted. See WYO. OIL AND GAS 
CONSERVATION COMM’N, wogcc.state.wy.us (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 46. Andrew M. Miller, Comment, A Journey Through Mineral Estate Dominance, the 
Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas is Ready to Take the Next Step with a Surface Damage 
Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461, 464 (2003). 
 47. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (holding that deed 
reservation did not authorize mineral owner to increase the burden on the surface estate for the benefit of 
additional lands). 
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IV. WIND–SCATTERED RESOURCES 
K.K. DUVIVIER**** 
Like Olympic contenders vying for the first-place podium, the United States and 
China have competed for the top spot in wind production since Germany lost that title in 
2009.48 Although China has more installed capacity,49 the United States became the 
world’s number one producer of wind in 2013.50 So the good news is that the United 
States has ample reserves—enough to power the entire current U.S. electricity demand 
twelve times over.51 Furthermore, the incentives to develop this climate-friendly source 
of electricity are strong—not only is it encouraged by state-enacted Renewable Portfolio 
Standards,52 but in some instances wind is also the most cost-effective source of 
electricity generation.53 
Despite these pluses, one fundamental trait plagues wind development and puts it 
at a colossal disadvantage against its fossil fuel competitors. The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has charitably called it “location constrained,”54 but in 
more blunt terms wind suffers from being a scattered resource. Some of the best U.S. 
wind reserves occur in a swath through the deep mid-belly of the country, in states like 
                                                          
****  Professor of Law, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. The author would like to 
thank Mark Safty for his feedback and her research assistant, Levi Stubbs, for his work on this piece. 
 
 48. K.K. DuVivier, The Renewable Energy Reader, U. DENVER LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 
11–19, (2011). Since 2009, U.S. wind energy capacity grew from approximately 25,000 MW to 61,000 MW. 
Wind Generation Records & Turbine Productivity, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
http://www.awea.org/Issues/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5806&RDtoken=22166&userID= (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2015). 
 49. Global Installed Wind Power Capacity (MW) – Regional Distribution, GLOBAL WIND 
ENERGY COUNCIL, http://www.gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/GLOBAL_INSTALLED_WIND_POWER_CAPACITY_MW_%E2%80%93_R
egional_Distribution.jpg (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). Ironically, Chinese wind projects also suffer from a lack 
of transmission to connect scattered resources to load centers. Kat Cheung, Integration of Renewables: Status 
and Challenges in China, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2011), 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Integration_of_Renewables.pdf. 
 50. Electric Power Monthly, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_1_a. The United States produced 
167,840 million megawatt hours in 2013. Id. 
 51. Electric Power Monthly, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_es1b; Anthony Lopez et al., Nat’l 
Renewable Energy Lab., U.S. Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis, iv (2012), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/51946.pdf. 
 52. Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850. 
 53. “Wind prices are extremely competitive right now, offering lower costs than other possible 
resources, like natural gas plants. These projects offer a great hedge against rising and often volatile fuel 
prices.” David Sparby, president & CEO of Xcel Energy’s Northern States Power announcing 600MW of 
new wind power contracts on July 16, 2013. The Cost of Wind Energy in the U.S., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5547#ComparativeCost (last visited Nov. 24, 
2015). 
 54. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 119 F.E.R.C. P 61,061 (2007); see also Heidi Werntz, Let’s 
Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 421 n.10 (2011). 
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North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, Kansas, and Iowa. 55 Ironically, these 
are also some of the states with the lowest populations and electricity demands.56 
Unlike other sources of energy that might be shipped by rail or barge, wind power 
can only be transported by transmission line. So what makes matters worse for scattered 
wind resources is that these wind-rich states are located in the no-man’s-land of the 
unconnected divide between the three major U.S. transmission interconnections.57 While 
first-generation wind farms could be built near existing transmission, further 
development of an energy superhighway is crucial to connect U.S. wind power reserves 
to load centers.58 
The federal government has attempted to address the scattered resources problem 
with both funding and policy measures. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 directed $3.4 billion dollars to modernizing the U.S. transmission grid.59 In 
addition, FERC orders, primarily addressing siting authority and cost allocation, sought 
to encourage regional and interregional cooperation by breaking down barriers 
perpetuating parochial approaches to transmission development. 
But the FERC solutions have been frustrating. First, courts have not upheld FERC’s 
transmission siting authority. 60 Second, Order 1000, which allows FERC to guide 
allocation formulas to help determine rates on a regional instead of a localized basis, has 
now been recognized by a federal court.61 However, that authority was vehemently 
resisted by sixty-one vested entities, “includ[ing] state regulatory agencies, electric 
transmission providers, regional transmission organizations, and electric industry trade 
associations”62 that are “weighing their options” after the most recent ruling and “are 
                                                          
 55. United States—Wind Resource Map, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
LAB., (May 6, 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/US-50m-wind-power-map.jpg. The rankings for best 
wind resources is as follows: 1) North Dakota; 2) Texas; 3) Kansas; 4) South Dakota; 5) Montana; 6) 
Nebraska; 7) Wyoming; 8) Oklahoma; 9) Minnesota; and 10) Iowa. Megan Phelps, The Best States for Wind 
Power, MOTHER EARTH NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.motherearthnews.com/renewable-energy/wind-
resources-united-states.aspx. 
 56. Electricity Consumption by State, UNIV. OF KAN., (2013), 
http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/ksdata/ksah/energy/18ener7.pdf. Excluding Texas from the states with the best 
resources, because of its size and its being its own interconnection, the top nine states account for 39.9% of 
the total installed wind power, and only consume about 9% of the electricity in the United States annually. 
Id.; Installed Wind Capacity, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (July 27, 2015), 
http://apps2.eere.energy.gov/wind/windexchange/wind_installed_capacity.asp. 
 57. Because of differing frequencies and lack of connections, there is virtually no electricity 
transfer between the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and Ercot, which serves only 
Texas.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1808. “Within each subregion, the electric network is highly 
interconnected and interdependent, but there is no capacity to move electricity between these three 
subregions.” Id. 
 58. Am. Wind Energy Ass’n & Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n, Green Power Superhighways: 
Building a Path to America’s Clean Energy Future 3 (2009), 
https://www.awea.org/files/FileDownloads/pdfs/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf.  
 59. Werntz, supra note 54, at 422. 
 60. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 309–10 (4th Cir. 2009); see also David A. 
King, Interregional Coordination of Electric Transmission and Its Impact on Texas Wind, 8 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, 
& ENERGY L. 309, 327 (2012–13) (citing Cal. Wilderness Coal v. DOE, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011)); Uma 
Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 261 (2011); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving 
Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1405, 1417–19 (2010). 
 61. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, No. 12-1232, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19968 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
17, 2014) (denying the petition for rehearing en banc) (effectively upholding F.E.R.C.’s power under 
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities); Order 
No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 1000].   
 62. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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likely in the future” to mount “[s]ignificant [additional] challenges to the scope of 
FERC’s granted power under [Order 1000]….”63 
Perhaps most significantly, the challenges to FERC’s authority have created delays 
in the development of Regional Transmission Organization [RTO] lines.64 By some 
estimates, the average timeline for a transmission project is seven years.65 The FERC 
1000 court challenges added four years to the front end of that process, and future 
challenges to FERC authority may push starts back even further. 
In addition, FERC 1000 does not mandate interconnection-wide transmission 
planning,66 but instead relies on voluntary agreement from beneficiaries.67 As a scattered 
resource, wind creates generation and consumption markets across state lines with 
especially contentious negotiations because the costs and “benefits of the proposed 
project may accrue unevenly to market participants.’”68 Thus, cost allocation remains one 
of the biggest challenges facing interstate transmission development.69 Even with 
increased FERC authority, the lengthy cost-allocation negotiations at the front end of the 
development process may push back the time to start the regulatory and permitting 
phases, delaying new transmission capacity for more than a decade. 
In this environment, the alternative of private merchant lines has become 
increasingly attractive.70 In contrast to the incremental steps that FERC has been able to 
achieve, the merchant-line process allows a jump start to transmission construction. One 
advantage for merchant developers is that they build transmission independently from 
incumbent utilities. Thus, the private merchant alternative does not require transforming 
and reworking traditional power structures.71 
Merchant lines are also able to circumvent the lengthy and difficult cost-allocation 
process. Private parties put up the capital for merchant line construction and recoup their 
investment through services charges. Because they do not serve “captive retail 
customers” as utilities do, these merchant developers have “the right to charge for 
transmission service at negotiated rates, unencumbered by the traditional cost of service 
ratemaking principles and filings usually applied to transmission service.” 72 
As a result, several merchant transmission lines appear to be closer to fruition than 
RTO lines. A few examples include the SunZia Southwest project, scheduled to begin in 
                                                          
 63. Recent Developments in Texas, United States, and International Energy Law, 10 TEX. J. OIL, 
GAS, & ENERGY L. 213, 253 (2014). 
 64. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870–72. 
 65. RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION ROADMAP, W. GOVERNOR’S ASS’N 6 (2010), 
http://www.westgov.org/images/dmdocuments/TransmissionRoadMap2010.pdf. 
 66. Order 1000, supra note 61, at 49,942 (“The Commission is not requiring either 
interconnectionwide planning or interconnectionwide cost allocation.”). 
 67. Order 1000, supra note 61, at 49,860. 
 68. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870 (quoting Sari Fink et al., National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Methodologies for Regional Transmission 
Organizations 2 (2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49880.pdf). 
 69. Klass & Wilson, supra note 18, at 1870. 
 70. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1120–31 
(2013) (comparing the “private independent [merchant] transmission lines” and traditional public utility lines 
in the context of eminent domain). 
 71. See Werntz, supra note 54, at 424–26. 
 72. Werntz, supra note 54, at 425. 
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2015;73 the Zephyr Transmission project, scheduled to begin construction in 2017;74 and 
the TransWest Express Transmission project, due to begin construction in 2015.75 In 
addition, some of these markets seem competitive as alternative private proposals have 
been made for some of the same routes.76 
In conclusion, wind power’s scattered nature will continue to challenge its 
development until transmission construction conundrums can be resolved. Expanding 
FERC’s authority may provide many long-term benefits for RTO lines, but continued 
delays threaten effective development.77 Merchant lines may have their problems,78 but 
currently these private sector solutions appear to be the more efficient solution for 
funding transmission lines to scattered wind resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 73. The SunZia Southwest Transmission Project is the first of the Rapid Response Team for 
Transmission (RRTT) projects to receive Department of Interior approval for its Right of Way. ETRANS 
FEDERAL PERMITTING TRANSMISSION TRACKING SYSTEM, http://trackingsystem.nisc-
llc.com/etrans/utility/Search.seam. After receiving the green light from the federal government, SunZia 
projected an early 2016 start date for construction. Zachary Ziegler, Power Line Project Gets Final Federal 
Permit, ARIZ. PUB. MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2015), https://news.azpm.org/p/news-spots/2015/1/27/55220-power-
line-project-gets-final-federal-permit/. However, the project must still receive approval from the New Mexico 
and Arizona state land boards and hit a snag in New Mexico where one official put the process temporarily 
on hold for further review. Staci Matlock, Land Commissioner Delays SunZia Transmission Line for Further 
Review, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/land-commissioner-delays-sunzia-transmission-line-
for-further-review/article_acb099d0-7512-53b2-9b1c-f65222d28680.html. 
 74. Zephyr Power Transmission Project, DUKE AM. TRANSMISSION CO., 
http://www.datcllc.com/projects/zephyr/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). Not one of the seven pilot projects 
undertaken by the Rapid Response Team for Transmission, but on a similar schedule as the large pilot 
merchant projects. Id.; Coordination of Federal Transmission Permitting on Federal Lands (216(H)), 
ENERGY.GOV, http://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-
implementation/transmission-planning/coordination (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
 75. Delivering Wyoming Wind Energy to the West, TRANSWEST EXPRESS, LLC, 
http://www.transwestexpress.net/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
 76. Nathanael Massey, Renewable Energy: Private Transmission Ventures Aim to Send Wyo.’s 
Wind Power South, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059975650 
(noting that multiple lines are being proposed and constructed to carry Wyoming wind to the southwestern 
states).  
 77. In addition, FERC 1000 has limited application, “only appl[ying] to jurisdictional public 
utilities, which include only the investor-owned utilities, and the RTOs which manage them under the Federal 
Power Act. This would include only approximately less than 200 entities among the approximately 3,000 
utilities in the U.S.” Steven Ferrey, Pentagon Preemption: The 5-Sided Loss of State Energy and Power, 2014 
U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 393, 420 (2014). 
 78. E.g., Recent Rulings from FERC, 4080 PUR Util. Reg. News 4 (July 27, 2012) (describing 
FERC decisions in favor of incumbent utilities as opposed to “merchant transmission developers regarding 
ownership and the right to build newly planned lines or related grid-related facilities”); Kevin B. Jones, David 
Clarke & James Parmelee, The LMP Model: Bottlenecking Merchant Transmission, 141 No. 8 Pub. Util. 
Fort. 35 (Apr. 15, 2003) (describing pricing and contract issues that are necessary to incentivize market-based 
solutions).  
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V. UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES: WHY UTILITIES DON’T BELONG IN 
ROOFTOP SOLAR MARKETS 
TROY A. RULE***** 
Distributed solar energy development has increased exponentially in the United 
States over the past decade. Much of this development has come in the form of 
photovoltaic (“PV”) solar panel installations on the rooftops of homes and small 
businesses. A combination of government incentive programs and falling PV prices has 
made these rooftop solar energy systems an increasingly attractive investment for electric 
utility customers throughout the country.79 
Although most rooftop solar energy companies surely welcome this coming-of-age 
of their industry, many electric utilities understandably take a less favorable view of it. 
Utility customers with rooftop solar panels tend to purchase far less electricity from their 
utilities than customers who have no solar panels. Consequently, the recent growth of 
distributed solar energy is beginning to adversely impact utilities’ revenues. 
Unfortunately for utilities, a strategy of increasing electricity rates to offset revenue 
growth reductions resulting from the emergence of rooftop solar technologies might well 
exacerbate rather than mitigate the problem. Such rate increases serve only to make 
rooftop solar power more cost-competitive with grid-supplied electricity and thereby 
prompt even more customers to go solar. 
With few other places to turn for additional revenue, utilities could eventually find 
themselves in what some have labeled a “death spiral”: a pattern in which electricity rates 
climb ever higher, prompting ever more customers to install their own distributed solar 
energy systems.80 In the worst-case version of this pattern, the spiral of rising electricity 
rates and increasing rooftop solar panel installations accelerates until the utility ultimately 
sinks into insolvency. 
Many utilities throughout the country are understandably seeking for ways to 
address the growing threats that distributed solar energy technologies pose to their long-
term survival. Over the past few years, numerous utilities in the United States have 
advocated for policy reforms that, if implemented, would unquestionably slow the pace 
of rooftop solar energy installations in their territories. These reform proposals have taken 
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 79. For information about the recent growth of rooftop solar energy, see generally SOLAR 
MARKET INSIGHT REPORT 2014 Q1, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, (2014), http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q1 (noting that the United States “installed 1,330 MWdc of solar 
PV in Q1 2014, up 79% over Q1 2013, making it the second-largest quarter for solar installations in the 
history of the market”). 
 80. See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-it-
yourself-power.html?_r=0 (stating that, “[a]s utilities put a heavier burden on fewer customers, it increases 
the appeal for them to turn their roofs over to solar panels” and that “[u]tility executives call this a ‘death 
spiral’”); Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 22, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579270362739732266 (noting some investors’ 
concerns about a “looming ‘death spiral’ for utilities, “with solar power as the culprit”). 
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a wide variety of forms, from increasing the fixed portion of customers’ utility bills to 
imposing special fees on solar energy users to reducing customers’ benefits under net 
metering programs. A few utilities have found some limited success in pursuing these 
types of reforms. However, most utilities are still searching for new ways to shore up 
their long-term stability against a rising tide of distributed solar technologies. 
Interestingly, a small number of utilities have recently begun experimenting with 
an entirely new, “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” sort of response to the rapid rise of 
distributed solar. This type of strategy is manifest in a handful of newly-proposed projects 
that would essentially allow utilities to directly compete as producers in private rooftop 
solar markets. Perhaps most notable among these projects is the one announced in 2014 
by the investor-owned utility Arizona Public Service Co. (“APS”), which services more 
than one million customers in Arizona. Under its plan, APS will lease rooftop space from 
1,500 residential households in exchange for a $30 per month credit on those households’ 
electricity bills.81 APS will then contract with private companies to install solar PV 
systems on all 1,500 rooftops. APS will own all of the solar panels involved in the project 
and the electricity the panels generate, which will flow directly onto the grid. Importantly, 
the $30 bill credit APS is offering to customers under its plan exceeds the average 
monthly net utility bill savings APS customers can presently get by purchasing or leasing 
rooftop solar panels in the private market and thereby buying less power from the utility.82 
In other words, the APS plan will undercut pricing in the competitive private rooftop solar 
energy market within its territory, giving customers little economic reason to go solar 
through any entity other than APS. 
Shortly after APS released its proposed rooftop solar plan, Tucson Electric Power 
(“TEP”)—a different investor-owned utility that also operates in Arizona—proposed a 
very similar sort of project. Under TEP’s proposed plan, residential customers would 
lease their rooftop space to the utility in exchange for the right to lock in a fixed price for 
grid-delivered electric power for 25 years.83 Like APS, TEP anticipates hiring local 
contractors to install solar PV systems on the rooftops of the homes of customers who 
enroll but TEP would own the systems and all of the power they generate. Comparable 
utility proposals have recently been floated in other states as well. 
What are the potential long-term consequences of allowing utilities to compete 
directly within the rooftop solar energy market through these types of programs? And 
what sorts of considerations should inform policy decisions relating to this trend? Policies 
                                                          
 81. The APS proposal initially involved 3,000 rooftops but was later reduced to 1,500. See 
generally Ryan Randazzo, APS Wants to Put Free Solar Panels on 3,000 Homes, AZ CENTRAL (July 28, 
2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/07/28/aps-wants-put-free-solar-panels-
homes/13299121/ [hereinafter Randazzo, APS Proposal] (describing the APS proposal); Ryan Randazzo, 
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http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/12/19/aps-will-move-ahead-free-solar/20670299/ 
(noting that the project received state utility commission approval but for only 1,500 homes rather than 3,000 
homes). Additional information about the APS rooftop solar proposal is also posted on the utility’s web page 
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 82. See Randazzo, APS Proposal, supra note 81 (noting that, when APS utility customers lease 
panels from the private rootop solar company SolarCity, “their new, lower power bills combined with the 
lease payments bring about $5 to $10 a month in savings for customers”). 
 83. See Robert Walton, Tucson Electric Power Proposes New Utility-Owned Rooftop Solar 
Program, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/tucson-electric-power-proposes-
new-utility-owned-rooftop-solar-program/299840/ (describing Tucson Electric Power’s proposal and 
quoting one solar energy industry advocate as accusing the utility of “trying to go into a completely new 
market and compete on an unlevel playing field in a market that’s already served by competitive forces”). 
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allowing electric utilities to enter into established, competitive markets are unprecedented 
and raise significant policy concerns. The impropriety of welcoming utilities into the 
rooftop solar energy market is most easily illuminated through the basic microeconomics 
framework that has long served as the primary theoretical basis for utility regulation itself. 
A. Natural Monopoly Theory 
The basic characteristics of electricity distribution make it inherently prone to a 
condition that economists describe as the “natural monopoly” problem.84 A natural 
monopoly is a firm that can produce all of the output demanded in its relevant market for 
a lower aggregate cost than is achievable by a group of smaller, competitive firms. This 
capability clearly exists for utilities in retail electricity distribution markets. The large up-
front expenditures associated with building out an extensive infrastructure system capable 
of distributing electric power to customers throughout a region make it very difficult for 
firms to enter such markets and effectively compete with incumbent utilities. In the 
absence of government intervention, such utilities would thus be largely free to act like 
monopolies, charging excessively high prices and raking in large profits without serious 
risk of a loss of market share. 
In recognition of this market failure, a heavy regulatory structure has long sought 
to prevent inefficient behavior by natural monopolies within the electricity distribution 
industry. Such regulations generally prohibit utilities from charging excessive prices and 
ensure that utilities provide service to all qualified customers within their service areas. 
In exchange for these obligations, state regulators protect utilities from certain types of 
competition and allow them to earn a reasonable return on their infrastructure 
investments. Although it is far from perfect, this regulatory approach has been fairly 
effective at promoting reliable, low-cost electric power distribution for a very long time. 
B. Rooftop Solar Markets are Not Prone to Natural Monopoly Problems 
Unfortunately, the current utility regulatory system is poorly suited for use in 
competitive markets such as the market for rooftop solar energy installations. Unlike 
markets for grid-supplied electricity, the market for rooftop solar energy installations is 
not prone to the natural monopoly problem. Entering the rooftop solar market as a 
producer does not require exceptionally large up-front investments. Low barriers to entry 
allow multiple retail solar panel sellers and installers to efficiently compete on price, 
quality and service. Likewise, it is not a waste of resources for multiple smaller, 
competing rooftop solar businesses to co-exist in the same geographic area. Accordingly, 
healthy market competition already exists in the rooftop solar industry, helping to 
promote continued innovation, quality products, and reasonable profit margins. Like the 
existing markets for rooftop shingles or rooftop gutters, the market for rooftop solar PV 
can function very efficiently without the sort of heavy government intervention that 
electricity distribution markets require. 
                                                          
 84. For a primer on natural monopolies and the predominant approach to regulating them, see 
generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53–65 (Foundation Press 
3d ed. 2010). 
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These fundamental differences between electricity distribution markets and the 
rooftop solar markets greatly affect how policymakers should approach project proposals 
like those of APS and TEP described above.85 Since rooftop solar markets are not prone 
to natural monopoly problems, utilities operating within regulatory regimes designed to 
address natural monopoly problems have no place in these markets. Allowing elements 
of a heavy regulatory structure designed to govern natural monopolies to creep into such 
private competitive markets is akin to administering a powerful prescription drug to a 
patient who is not sick: no real benefits are likely to result, yet it has the potential to cause 
costly and harmful side effects. 
To permit regulated utilities to compete as producers in rooftop solar markets 
through projects like those proposed by APS and TEP would essentially stack the deck 
in such utilities’ favor. Regulated utilities often have access to lower-cost capital, large 
customer bases, and market risk protections that simply are not available to non-utility 
rooftop solar installation firms. Lacking equivalent advantages, many companies are 
likely to pull out of rooftop solar markets where utilities are permitted to directly compete. 
As they do, an industry that once thrived under healthy competition will gradually 
degenerate into one unnecessarily burdened with inefficiencies and stifled innovation. 
C. Avoiding an “Unnatural Monopoly” Problem in the Rooftop Solar Industry 
The present struggle between electric utilities and the rooftop solar energy industry 
is not the first time that a regulated utility has sought to protect its monopoly against 
disruptive innovation. Some have used the term “unnatural monopoly” to describe such 
instances when a regulated utility is permitted to enter an industry that is not prone to 
natural monopoly problems.86 Policies that perpetuate such unnatural monopoly problems 
tend to be highly inefficient and are rarely cost-justified.87 
For example, an analogous sort of unnatural monopoly problem existed toward the 
end of AT&T’s control of telecommunication markets in the 1980s and 90s. 
Understandably, AT&T would have liked to respond to technological advancements that 
were transforming the landline telephone industry through new ventures enabled the 
company to compete directly in the emerging markets that threatened its monopoly 
position.88 However, Congress and regulators eventually erected various barriers between 
AT&T and those emerging technology markets to help prevent AT&T from abusing its 
incumbent utility status to gain an anticompetitive advantage in those new industries.89 
A similar sort of policy response is needed today in the context of rooftop solar 
energy. Policymakers would never permit a regulated electric utility to begin selling 
                                                          
 85. See generally supra text accompanying nn. 84–86. 
 86. See generally Adam D. Thierer, Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development 
of the Bell System Monopoly, 14 CATO J. 267 (1994), 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1994/11/cj14n2-6.pdf. 
 87. See id. at 267 (noting that utility regulation in the telecommunications industry in the 1990s 
was “impeding the growth of new technologies, jobs, and exports, while simultaneously denying consumers 
the benefits of competition.”). 
 88. See Jordan Jay Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Regulated 
Monopolist, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1224 (1984) (stating that “AT&T would undoubtedly have preferred 
to enter” emerging, unregulated markets for computer-based data processing “free from any structural 
constraints”).   
 89. See id. at 1224–29 (describing numerous constraints on AT&T’s ability to compete directly 
in emerging technology markets that threatened its monopoly on telecommunication services). 
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rooftop shingles or rooftop gutters in the private marketplace. For similar reasons, entities 
that enjoy the advantages of being regulated electric utilities should not be permitted to 
compete directly in the market for rooftop solar installations. Electric utilities and their 
subsidiaries should be required to forfeit all regulatory protections and become fully 
privatized before competing as producers in these markets. This principle should apply 
even to subtle forms of market entry like those exemplified by the recent APS and TEP 
project proposals. Policies that consciously guard against unnatural monopoly problems 
through these and other means will promote greater economic efficiency as innovation 
continues to transform electricity markets in the coming years. 
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VI. THE RISKS OF OPTING OUT OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR 
WESTERN STATES 
MELISSA POWERS****** 
A. Introduction 
In June 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its proposed 
Clean Power Plan, a Clean Air Act regulation that would require existing fossil fuel-fired 
power plants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.90 Opposition to the proposal was 
swift. Companies in the coal industry and several states preemptively challenged the 
Clean Power Plan in court, arguing that EPA lacks statutory authority to regulate the 
emissions from existing power plants.91 Opponents to the Clean Power Plan also argued 
in court, before Congress, and in the press that the plan was unconstitutional.92 Many 
states and regulated parties likewise asserted that the plan would be unworkable and 
unduly expensive. Finally, in March 2014, in an asserted attempt to fight back against the 
Obama Administration’s purported “war on coal,” Senator Mitch McConnell began to 
urge states to “just say no” to the Clean Power Plan by refusing to adopt state strategies 
to implement the plan’s emissions limits.93 
The “just say no” campaign immediately attracted significant media attention and 
opposition from EPA and the Clean Power Plan’s supporters.94 These responses 
undoubtedly fulfilled some of Senator McConnell’s goals to drive further wedges 
between advocates and opponents of the Clean Power Plan. However, setting politics 
aside, it would be shortsighted and counter-productive for western states to heed Senator 
McConnell’s advice. As this essay will explain, western states that pursue an “opt-out” 
strategy will surrender significant decision-making authority to the EPA as a result of the 
cooperative-federalism structure of the Clean Air Act. Although these states could 
ultimately regain the power to administer the Clean Power Plan, they would nonetheless 
lose the ability to establish a guiding structure for the Clean Power Plan’s implementation 
in the West. By the time states step in to take over the Clean Power Plan from EPA, it 
could be too late for them to reverse the course set by other states interested in creating a 
regional framework for implementing the Plan. Thus, rather than opt out, this essay 
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 90. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 FED. REG. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean 
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 91. See West Virginia v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (In re Murray Energy Corp.), 788 F.3d 330, 
333 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 92. See Coral Davenport, McConnell Urges States to Help Thwart Obama’s “War on Coal”, N.Y. 
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argues that western states—even those opposed to the Plan—should start planning their 
implementation strategies. 
Part B of the essay briefly introduces the Clean Power Plan and the structure the 
Clean Air Act establishes for implementing existing source emissions standards. Part C 
discusses the underlying objective of Senator McConnell’s opt-out advice and how that 
would affect states that pursued an opt-out strategy. Part D then argues that western states 
should eschew the opt-out approach, even if they otherwise object to the Clean Power 
Plan. 
B. The Clean Power Plan in a Nutshell 
The Clean Power Plan is a proposed regulation under Clean Air Act section 111(d) 
that would require existing fossil fuel-fired power plants to reduce their emissions of 
carbon dioxide. Section 111(d) generally gives states the primary responsibility for 
regulating existing source emissions, subject to EPA-established requirements.95 Section 
111(d) regulates a narrow set of pollutants, 96 however, and it has been rarely used to date. 
EPA’s proposal for applying section 111(d) to carbon dioxide emissions from power 
plants is undoubtedly ambitious. 
Pollutants regulated under section 111(d) are subject to “standards of 
performance.”97 A standard of performance is 
 a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and 
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) 
the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.98 
Traditionally, EPA has treated standards of performance as technology-based emissions 
limitations achievable by the affected sources. 
With the proposed Clean Power Plan, however, EPA focused on the phrase “best 
system of emission reduction” to propose emissions limitations based on what the 
electricity system could achieve as a whole.99 Under this system-wide approach, EPA 
proposed emissions limitations that could be achieved through the use of four building 
blocks: 1) efficiency gains at each affected power plant, 2) reduced use of high-emitting 
affected power plants in favor of increase use of lower-emitting affected power plants, 3) 
reduced generation at all affected power plants in favor of low- and zero-carbon sources 
(i.e., renewable and nuclear power plants), and 4) reduced generation at all affected power 
plants through energy efficiency.100 In other words, rather than consider how technology 
applied only to regulated facilities might lower emissions, EPA considered how 
improvements to each state’s electricity system might enable reduced emissions at each 
                                                          
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012). 
 96. Id. The scope of this regulatory power is at issue in the Murray Energy lawsuit, supra note  
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012). 
 98. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012). 
 99. Clean Power Plan, supra note 90, at 34,834–35. 
 100. Id. at 34,836. 
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affected source. EPA then created state-specific emissions rates (what EPA calls state-
specific goals) that states would implement.101 
States have the primary responsibility for implementing section 111(d). 
Specifically, section 111(d) directs EPA to “establish a procedure” under which states 
shall submit to the EPA a plan establishing standards of performance for regulated 
existing source emissions and requirements for the implementation and enforcement of 
the standards of performance.102 If a state fails to submit a satisfactory plan, EPA may 
promulgate a federal plan instead.103 
In the draft Clean Power Plan, EPA likewise proposed that states would play the 
primary role in implementing the standards of performance for the affected power plants. 
Under EPA’s proposed rules, states could therefore decide whether to apply the state-
specific goals to the affected sources or whether to develop an alternative compliance 
strategy.104For example, states might adopt a cap-and-trade program to reduce statewide 
carbon dioxide emissions.105 Or states might aim to displace carbon dioxide emissions by 
increasing renewable power generation.106 Ultimately, under the proposed Clean Power 
Plan, states would have broad discretion so long as they adopt their own plan. If, however, 
a state opts out of the planning process, EPA would decide how to implement the state-
specific goals. 
C. The “Just Say No” Strategy 
EPA’s draft rule prompted an early—and likely premature—rush to the courthouse, 
first by fossil fuel producers and then by several Republican states. Their suits raise a 
host of legal and constitutional arguments. The constitutional arguments have earned 
quite a bit of media attention, largely because Laurence Tribe—who is generally 
considered a liberal constitutional scholar—has made them.107 Seemingly emboldened by 
these legal arguments108 (but also perhaps fearful that the D.C. Circuit would dismiss the 
suits as unripe), Senator McConnell jumped into the fray with his “just say no” campaign. 
In an op-ed109 and a letter sent to the National Governors Association,110 Senator 
McConnell urged state political leaders to refuse to adopt their own SIPs to implement 
the Clean Power Plan. 
Senator McConnell appears to be motivated by a number of factors. First, he 
expressly stated that he hopes the opt-out strategy would serve as a stalling tactic, 
enabling the Clean Power Plan to languish while future legal challenges and repeal efforts 
ensue.111 Underlying this hope must be his fear that the Plan will gather momentum and 
support as states work to implement it while legal challenges proceed. Second, Senator 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 34,895. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2). 
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still have to meet the required emissions reductions. 
 107. Davenport, supra note 92. 
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 110. Letter from Sen. Mitch McConnell to Nat’l Governors Ass’n (Mar. 19, 2015), 
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McConnell may be trying to upset the international negotiations to create the next climate 
change treaty.112 If enough states opt out of the Clean Power Plan, this may send a 
message to the rest of the world that the United States is not serious about reducing its 
own greenhouse gas emissions. Third, the opt-out strategy could help perpetuate the 
partisan political divide that has enabled the Republican Party to regain control of 
Congress and attract massive political donations. If states refuse to develop their own 
plans, and EPA develops plans in their place, this would feed into Republican attempts 
to portray the President as an out-of-control dictator.113 Whatever his motivations, 
Senator McConnell’s opt-out proposal has both garnered praise and incited outrage. 
D. Opting Out is Not in Western States’ Best Interests 
While some states may find the opt-out strategy politically appealing, they should 
reject Senator McConnell’s “just say no” advice. States that opt out will miss the 
opportunity to influence any regional plans that western states may develop under the 
Clean Power Plan framework. While states would have the opportunity to develop an SIP 
and take over the planning and implementation process at a later time, it could be too late 
for those states to meaningfully affect policy. Moreover, opting out is an impractical 
strategy for western states with utilities that operate in multiple jurisdictions. Finally, 
opting out could undermine states’ nascent renewable energy industries at the very 
moment when renewable power production could become more lucrative. 
States that “opt out” will miss out on opportunities to influence regional plans. 
Although it is possible that states in the West could pursue a go-it-alone strategy, most 
observers think that the history of electricity coordination between western states makes 
it more likely that states would enter into regional plans.114 States that sit on the sidelines 
could lose influence in the planning process. For example, some observers believe that 
Washington, Oregon, and California could enter into a regional implementation 
agreement that would flow from the states’ agreement to cooperate to address climate 
change and boost renewable energy.115 The states could potentially attempt to extend 
California’s emissions trading program for greenhouse gases up the Pacific Coast 
(although that would likely require enacting legislation in Oregon and Washington) or 
they might instead design a renewable energy credit trading scheme to facilitate 
renewable power development. Under either context, other states could experience 
knock-on effects they could not directly control. For example, a regional agreement 
between the Pacific Coast states could influence the planning decisions of the Northwest 
Power and Conservation Council (NWPCC), of which Idaho and Montana are members, 
along with Oregon and Washington. The NWPCC develops five-year plans for energy 
use and conservation based on a number of assumptions, including economic conditions, 
regulatory requirements, price forecasts, population growth, and other factors that 
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contribute to energy consumption.116 If Oregon and Washington join a regional 
implementation plan but Montana and Idaho do not, NWPCC would still have to consider 
how Oregon and Washington’s plan would affect the Northwest’s energy mix. Thus, 
sitting the planning process out would not insulate states from the practical effects of a 
regional plan. 
It is true that states could take back their implementation authority from EPA if 
they were to develop SIPs and receive EPA’s approval at some later point. By that time, 
however, the state would either have to comply individually or join an existing regional 
plan (or try to create a separate regional agreement, which is unlikely). If a state that had 
opted out later sought to join a regional agreement, it could find itself at a disadvantage. 
The details of an emissions trading program could make compliance easier for some 
states and more challenging for others. As the old adage goes, “if you’re not at the table, 
you’re on the menu.” Electricity regulators in Ohio made a similar point recently to their 
own political leaders, noting that an opt-out strategy could unduly tie the state’s hands 
and expose their ratepayers to higher compliance costs.117 
Opting out is also impractical and risky for utilities that operate in multiple states. 
PacifiCorp, which has subsidiaries that operate in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, 
Utah, and Wyoming, faces particular risk.118 Its coal-fired power plants in Utah and 
Wyoming currently provide a substantial amount of power to the other states. If some of 
these other states adopt implementation plans that go beyond EPA’s proposed guidelines, 
their reliance on imported coal-based power could drop below expectations. If demand 
drops substantially, PacifiCorp could find the plants uneconomical to operate, and it could 
seek rate increases in the states that opted out to compensate for lower demand. While a 
regional plan could produce these effects as well, utilities and states would at least be 
able to plan strategically for the anticipated reductions on coal-fired power production. 
Sitting the planning process out would undermine any strategic efforts. 
Finally, states that opt out may miss out on renewable power development 
opportunities. For example, a Pacific Coast regional renewable energy plan could 
promote the formation of new long-term contracts and development of new transmission 
lines to facilitate power deliveries from eastern Washington and Oregon (which have a 
lot of wind and solar power) to energy-hungry California. Other western states with wind 
and solar resources might find it more difficult to access California’s renewable energy 
market. Insufficient transmission capacity has already been a hurdle in states like 
Montana, and a failure to plan at the regional level for renewable power growth could 
place states like Montana at a further disadvantage. 
In sum, while the opt-out idea may sound politically appealing to state leaders who 
believe the Clean Power Plan is illegal and unwise, the risks of opting out are too great, 
particularly in the West. States who oppose the Clean Power Plan would be better off 
following the approach Ohio regulators have advocated: let the political leaders pursue 
their legal challenges in court, but let the regulators continue planning, just in case. And 
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who knows? Maybe the regulators will decide that the Clean Power Plan offers 
opportunities, not just obligations. 
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VII. RENEWABLE ENERGY ON PUBLIC LANDS: HOW U.S. POLICY FAILS TO 
PROMOTE RENEWABLES 
NICK LAWTON******* 
The United States and the Obama administration purport to promote renewable 
energy on federal public lands.119 However, policies in place and in progress fail to create 
a regulatory environment that promotes renewables nearly as effectively as fossil fuels. 
Consequently, U.S. energy production from public lands will likely continue to skew 
toward fossil fuels. 
The United States owns roughly 640 million acres of public lands, with most 
situated in 11 western states.120 Indeed, the United States owns roughly half of all lands 
in the West, most of which falls under control of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
and the United States Forest Service (USFS).121 In contrast, the United States owns 
roughly 4% of the land in Eastern states.122 Thus, public lands management is mostly a 
western issue. 
Because public lands include some areas with excellent access to sun and wind, 
land management policy is critical to western energy development. The Wilderness 
Society has estimated that U.S. public lands have the technical potential to generate 2,900 
gigawatts of solar power in the Southwest and 206 gigawatts of wind power throughout 
the West.123 In comparison, the United States needed 966 GW of generating capacity in 
2013 to ensure stable power supplies.124 Thus, U.S. public lands have the potential to 
generate far more renewable energy than the nation actually requires.125 
Because the United States governs public lands with complex regulations, western 
states face unique challenges for renewable energy development. Nevertheless, western 
states have overwhelmingly adopted policies requiring renewable energy to satisfy 
significant shares of state energy use.126 And these goals will likely grow more rigorous. 
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The falling price of renewable energy makes it increasingly desirable,127 and the federal 
Clean Power Plan may drive renewable energy development.128 California has already 
proposed requiring 50% renewable energy by 2050.129 Reaching expanded renewable 
energy development goals—and the ultimate goal of a carbon-free electricity system—
will likely require renewable energy from public lands. Both because BLM administers 
many public lands, and because BLM lands are generally well suited for renewables, most 
development will likely occur on BLM lands. 
Title V of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) governs 
renewable energy development on BLM Lands.130 Under BLM’s current regulations, 
developers must obtain “rights of way,”131 which generally are not competitive. BLM 
issues rights of way for renewables on a first-come, first-served basis, managing 
competitive leasing only when two developers apply for rights to the same parcel.132 To 
obtain a right of way, a developer must submit a development plan, conduct 
environmental impact analyses, and pay fair market value to the U.S. Treasury.133 Neither 
BLM nor states receive revenue directly from rights of way.134 
Additionally, BLM has begun integrating renewable energy planning into 
comprehensive Resource Management Plans (RMPs).135 In this process, BLM identifies 
lands best suited for renewables and closes other parcels due to conflicts with wildlife or 
other land uses. Proposed RMPs in which BLM has done this suggest that the agency will 
likely close many lands to renewables.136 Because the RMP process requires significant 
environmental analysis, to which later development can refer, this process will in theory 
save later developers time and money. 
Federal mandates require BLM to permit some renewable energy development. The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires BLM to approve at least 10,000 megawatts (MW) of 
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renewables on public lands by 2015,137 while President Obama’s Climate Action Plan 
requires approval of at least 20,000 MW by 2020.138 Since 2010, BLM has approved 33 
solar projects with capacity of over 8,000 MW, 39 wind projects with capacity of 5,557 
MW, and 59 geothermal facilities with capacity of 1,500 MW.139 Thus, BLM is making 
progress toward federal goals. 
However, in other regards renewable energy development on public lands appears 
laggardly. The Los Angeles Times reports that in California, BLM has approved only 18 
of 375 applications for renewable energy rights of way since 2007.140 The American Wind 
Energy Association reports that through 2012, only 1.4% of wind energy was sited on 
public lands.141 The Solar Energy Industries Association reports that public lands host 
only 23% of operational utility-scale solar facilities and only 36% of facilities under 
construction.142 And the National Wildlife Federation criticizes current regulations as 
“outdated and inefficient,” inadequate to assess wildlife impacts, and prone to increase 
“costs and risk to investors.”143 Thus, public lands still pose a daunting challenge for 
renewable energy. 
Both BLM and Congress have proposed reforms that would ostensibly promote 
renewable energy on public lands. BLM is currently considering comments on a new 
competitive leasing rule.144 Meanwhile, the 113th Congress considered, but failed to pass, 
a similar bill that would also have shared revenues.145 However, neither measure will 
significantly alter the regulatory landscape for renewable energy on public lands. 
Under BLM’s proposed rule, competitive leasing would become the default for 
renewable energy.146 The proposed rule aims to channel development to “designated 
leasing areas” (DLAs) by offering more favorable lease terms for projects located therein, 
including lower rents and fees.147 All projects would owe acreage-based rent and a fee 
based on electricity generating capacity.148 Revenues would remain with the U.S. 
treasury.149 
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BLM’s proposed rule would help avoid wildlife and land use conflicts by 
channeling development to DLAs, but would not otherwise make development easier. In 
fact, the proposed rule has several weaknesses. BLM recognizes that capacity factors for 
renewables vary geographically, but the rule would use only one national average,150 
fixing an inappropriately high fee for less sunny or windy climes. Similarly, the rule 
would charge inflexible fixed fees to variable generators,151 which would produce 
hardship in less sunny or windy times. Additionally, the rule inflates capacity fees 
through reliance on high, outdated wholesale power prices.152 The greatest defect, though, 
is delayed gratification. Designating DLAs in RMPs will take years: one proposed RMP 
in Colorado took 8 years to develop.153 Consequently, the rule’s main incentives will take 
effect slowly and variably, risking geographical inequity. More fundamentally, the rule 
focuses more on getting more money out of renewable energy, rather than lowering its 
costs or easing its access to lands, suggesting that it would not really promote more 
renewable energy. 
The 113th Congress, meanwhile, considered a more helpful bill, but failed to pass 
it.154 That bill would also have promoted competitive leasing, but its most interesting 
feature was royalty sharing. Under the bill, the U.S. Treasury would have received only 
10% of revenues, the land-management agency (usually BLM) would have received 15%, 
and states and counties would have received 25% each. The remaining 25% would have 
gone to a conservation fund to restore lands or wildlife damaged by renewable energy 
development. However, despite broad support from states, counties, and 
environmentalists, the 113th Congress failed to pass this bill. The odds of a similar bill 
passing the 114th Congress seem negligible. 
Thus, neither the current system nor proposed reforms will likely change the 
regulatory landscape for renewables on public lands. Policies favoring fossil fuels will 
likely persist. Current approval rates for renewable energy rights of way versus fossil fuel 
leases suggest the latter are far easier to obtain. The L.A. Times reports that BLM has 
approved only 18 of 375 renewable energy rights of way in California since 2007.155 In 
contrast, Greenwire reports that many companies are stockpiling thousands of unused oil 
and gas extraction permits.156 In sum, the federal government’s sound and fury about 
promoting renewable energy on public lands seem to signify nothing. 
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VIII. UTILITY REFORM IN HAWAII AND NEW YORK: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE NORTHWEST 
NATE LARSEN******** 
The American energy sector is rapidly evolving. Renewables are approaching 
economic parity with fossil resources,157 and President Obama has demonstrated a 
newfound resolve to act to combat climate change.158 Recognizing the disruptive potential 
of this evolution, state regulators are beginning to develop reforms to encourage the 
transition toward a cleaner, smarter, and more resilient electricity system. 
Hawaii and New York were among the first states to pursue these reforms in a 
comprehensive manner. Within a period of four days between April 24 and April 28, 
2014, both states issued sweeping proposals to modernize their electric industries. This 
article examines these proposed reforms and evaluates the impacts these policies may 
have on the electric industry in the Northwest. 
A. Background 
Despite the similarities of Hawaii’s and New York’s proposals, the circumstances 
that motivated these states to implement reforms differ considerably. 
The Hawaiian electricity system is unique in the United States; it is not 
interconnected with the mainland, it is fueled primarily by imported petroleum, and it 
boasts the most customer-sited solar generation in the country. Due to these factors, 
Hawaii has the highest retail electric rates in the nation. As a result, Hawaiians have 
embraced the state’s net metering program, installing rooftop solar on as many as 11% of 
households on some islands. Additionally, the state boasts the highest Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) in the country—40% renewable energy by 2030—with an 
additional 30% load reduction from energy efficiency. Facing high energy costs, 
aggressive RPS requirements, and the impending economic parity of some renewable 
resources with fossil fuel resources, Hawaii’s PUC recognized the need to reform its 
regulatory regime to reflect the state’s energy realities and ambitions. 
On April 28, 2014, the Hawaii PUC directed the state’s investor-owned utilities, 
which collectively comprise the HECO Companies (HECO) to file plans in accordance 
with the state’s policy objectives. To guide HECO in drafting those plans, the PUC 
concurrently issued its Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of Hawaii’s Electric 
Utilities (Commission’s Inclinations) white paper.159 HECO subsequently filed its 
required plans on August 26, 2014.160 
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The motivating circumstances that culminated in Hawaii’s reforms differ from the 
circumstances in New York. New York deregulated its electric industry in 1996, which 
means that Independent Power Producers own most of the state’s generation facilities and 
customers can purchase power from over 50 non-utility energy suppliers. Nevertheless, 
New York has the fifth highest electricity rates in the U.S. 161 In addition, the impacts of 
Hurricane Sandy highlighted the importance of grid resilience in the state. 
On April 24, 2014, in response to directives from the New York Public Service 
Commission (PSC), the New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) released a 
staff report and proposal, entitled Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), which proposed 
an array of sweeping reforms to the state’s electric industry.162 The following day, the 
PSC issued an order initiating a two-track proceeding to consider and recommend specific 
regulatory actions to address the issues raised in the REV. 163 
B. Reforms 
The utility reform proposals that Hawaii and New York each put forward include a 
number of policy similarities, despite the divergent circumstances that led the states to 
initiate reforms. These common elements include the modernization of the distribution 
system, customer engagement and the development of a market structure to support a 
modern distribution system, and changes to the regulatory regime to reflect those new 
realities. 
1. Distribution System Managers 
In both Hawaii’s Commission’s Inclinations and New York’s REV proposals, 
regulators anticipate a transition away from the traditional utility model of electricity 
generation and delivery towards a more dynamic and flexible system of integrated 
distributed energy resources (DER), including customer-sited generation, demand 
response, and energy efficiency. Utility roles will thus need to shift from electricity 
generators and providers to distribution system managers that facilitate DER 
development while ensuring system reliability. 
In its Commission’s Inclinations guidance document, the Hawaii PUC highlighted 
the need for HECO to develop a distribution system that can both deliver power to 
customers and accept power from distributed resources.164 To address that need, the PUC 
ordered HECO to file a plan to modernize the distribution grid. 
In its REV straw proposal and report, the New York DPS proposed to create 
entities—Distributed System Platform Providers (DSPPs)—specifically responsible for 
managing the distribution grid. The New York DPS envisions that DSPPs will play three 
primary roles in the future of New York’s electricity system: 1) operating and maintaining 
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the distribution grid; 2) managing markets and tariffs to monetize DER integration; and 
3) serving as an intermediary between retail customers and the transmission grid. The 
REV identifies incumbent distribution utilities as the optimal entities to fill that role.165 
2. Customer Engagement 
In both the Commission’s Inclinations and the REV proposals, customer 
engagement is deemed important to distribution system operations. Although both states’ 
reforms represent significant departures from the traditional electricity consumer model, 
customers may still choose to receive bundled electricity service under the proposed 
reforms. 
In Hawaii, where renewable energy is approaching economic parity with traditional 
resources, the PUC directed HECO to consider upgrading the distribution system to 
accommodate distributed generation and demand response. Likewise, New York 
regulators envision widespread participation in an active distribution market, where DER 
consumers can sell products and services from their systems. 
3. Regulatory Reforms 
Regulators in both Hawaii and New York proposed rate design and ratemaking 
reforms to facilitate the modernization of their distribution systems. These rate design 
reforms attempt to address cost allocation issues and allow customers to select electricity 
products and services based on their individual needs. The states’ proposed ratemaking 
reforms decouple volumetric electricity sales from utility profits, and instead connect 
profits with desirable policy outcomes. Rather than discussing both states’ rate design 
and ratemaking reform proposals, the following sections consider Hawaii’s proposed rate 
design reforms and the changes that DPS staff proposed to New York’s ratemaking 
regime. 
C. Hawaii’s Rate Design Reforms 
The Hawaii PUC proposed a number of options for reforming HECO’s rate design 
to address perceived cost allocation issues associated with Hawaii’s high levels of 
distributed generation. These options include: 1) implementing an unbundled retail 
electricity rate structure, 2) transitioning to capacity-based, fixed-cost based pricing, and 
3) adopting a supplemental power supply pricing structure. The mechanics of these 
options vary, but each would charge DG customers for the grid-related services they 
consume. 
In response, HECO proposed eliminating Hawaii’s Net Energy Metering (NEM) 
program and allocating distribution-related costs among DG customers via fixed 
charges.166 HECO asserted that the NEM program creates cost-allocation inequities, 
because NEM customers do not pay their share of the costs associated with safely and 
reliably delivering electricity.167 In place of the NEM program, HECO proposed to 
compensate DG customers through a tariff rate indexed to a market-based proxy, such as 
a renewable energy power purchase agreements.168 In addition to effectively decreasing 
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their compensation, HECO proposed to subject DG customers to fixed interconnection 
and grid services charges.169 These reforms would significantly diminish the value of 
consumer-owned DG resources. 
D. New York’s Ratemaking Reforms 
New York’s DPS staff proposed a variety of modifications to New York’s 
ratemaking model, including implementing 1) long-term rate plans, 2) outcome (or 
results-based) ratemaking, 3) symmetrical incentives, and 4) revenue decoupling 
mechanisms. 
First, the REV proposed to extend the rate plan period up to eight years, a move 
which would provide added certainty, reduce expenses related to contested rate cases, 
and encourage utilities to reduce expenses to achieve higher profits. Second, the REV 
proposed outcome or results-based ratemaking. Rather than incentivizing capital-
intensive investments, outcome-based ratemaking would reward utilities for achieving 
customer value and desirable policy objectives. Third, the REV proposed symmetrical 
incentives, which would retain negative incentives and include positive incentives for 
utilities that provide high-quality service or otherwise achieve policy goals. Fourth, the 
REV proposed revenue decoupling mechanisms, which remove the connection between 
a utility’s electricity sales volume and its revenue. 
E. Impacts in the Northwest 
The Northwest electric industry bears little semblance to the industries in Hawaii 
or New York, and most of the factors driving those states towards comprehensive utility 
reform are not present in the region. First, Northwestern states generally have among the 
lowest electricity rates in the country. Second, the region contains a large number of 
publicly-owned utilities, which are not under the jurisdiction of state regulators. Third, 
DG penetration in the Northwest is limited, so utilities are not clamoring for cost-recovery 
reforms to the same extent as in Hawaii. The Northwest, then, has the luxury of adopting 
a “wait-and-see” approach to comprehensive utility reform. 
However, Northwest states will likely have to pursue similar reforms eventually. 
Federal and state policies, such as the federally-proposed Clean Power Plan, state RPS 
goals, and widespread net metering programs, will drive the deployment of DERs. States 
should avoid following a piecemeal approach to reform, which could create impacts that 
frustrate public policy goals. For example, eliminating net-metering programs without 
first establishing a robust rate design model will dampen development of DERs. Instead, 
Northwestern states should monitor the reforms in Hawaii and New York and develop a 
set of best practices to implement at an appropriate time. 
F. Conclusion 
Advances in renewable energy technologies and mounting concerns about climate 
change are driving a transition in the U.S. electric industry, and Hawaii and New York 
were among the first states to pursue comprehensive utility reforms to address these 
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changes. Regulators in both states proposed similar reforms to encourage the transition 
to a modern electricity system, including creating entities to manage the distribution 
system, facilitating customer engagement, and reforming the rate design and ratemaking 
models to reflect new realities. Although the Northwest electric industry does not yet face 
the same pressures as the industries in Hawaii and New York, Northwestern regulators 
should monitor the reform processes in those states, and develop a set of best practices to 
implement at an appropriate time. 
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IX. TRANSITIONING FROM COAL TO CLEAN ENERGY IN THE WEST: THE 
CLEAN POWER PLAN’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN GRID 
AMELIA SCHLUSSER********* 
In June 2014, EPA issued a draft rule to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from 
existing electricity generating units in accordance with section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act.170 This proposed rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), requires all states to 
reduce carbon emissions rates from existing power plants by a specified percent below 
2012 levels by 2030. In the western United States, these emission goals range from 19% 
in Wyoming to 72% in Washington. EPA proposed for states to meet these targets 
through a series of “building blocks,” which include increasing coal plant efficiencies, 
replacing coal power with natural gas, increasing renewable energy generation, and 
increasing energy efficiency. 
The electricity needs of the western United States are served through the Western 
Interconnection, which is an electrical grid spanning eleven states. As proposed, the CPP 
will alter the generation mix in the west, which presents significant implications for the 
grid. Western states currently generate more than 32,000 MW of electricity from coal.171 
Some western states are far more reliant on coal than others; for example, nearly 89% of 
Wyoming’s electricity came from coal in 2013.172 Coal also played a significant role in 
shaping the western transmission system. Coal-fired power plants are the primary 
baseload resources in the intermountain west, and the transmission system was designed 
to connect these plants to major cities. However, due to the CPP and other state and 
federal policies, EPA anticipates significant coal plant retirements in the west between 
2010 and 2024.173 The Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC)174 projects that 
8,643 MW of western coal generation will retire by 2025.175 Meanwhile, the CPP’s 
renewable energy target for the west calls for the west to generate an additional 
78,811,741 MWh from renewable resources by 2030.176 
These anticipated changes in the west’s generation mix create challenges and 
opportunities for transmission planning and grid modernization throughout the region. 
On the one hand, the anticipated coal plant retirements will significantly reduce the west’s 
baseload generating capacity, which may create reliability concerns for the grid. On the 
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other hand, this presents an opportunity to replace polluting coal power with sustainable 
renewable energy resources. 
A. The Challenges: Transmission Constraints and Reliability Concerns 
The western United States has the potential to generate more than enough 
renewable energy to satisfy the CPP’s emission reduction requirements. However, there 
are two primary challenges to deploying high levels of renewable energy over the western 
grid. First, the west lacks the infrastructure necessary to connect remote, high-quality 
renewable energy hubs to major load centers. Second, replacing baseload coal power with 
variable renewable energy can create reliability and integration challenges. Fortunately, 
these challenges are not insurmountable and they provide an opportunity to create a 
sustainable, reliable grid. 
1. Transmission Constraints 
The Western Governors Association’s Western Renewable Energy Zones (WREZ) 
initiative identified a number of “hubs” with access to high-value renewable energy.177 
These WREZ hubs have the potential to provide all of the substitute energy required 
under the proposed CPP, but a lack of transmission access impedes development at these 
sites. Renewable energy developers generally are not interested in constructing projects 
in remote areas unless transmission already exists or there is a high degree of certainty 
that transmission will be constructed in the near future. Because many WREZ hubs are 
in remote areas without transmission access, western states will need to expand and 
optimize the grid to access these high-quality resources. 
However, western grid expansion faces a number of hurdles. The main obstacles 
for developing interstate transmission include 1) demonstrating that new transmission is 
needed and in the public interest; 2) siting challenges, including inconsistent and 
uncoordinated regulatory frameworks; and 3) cost allocation and recovery challenges. 
These constraints present significant uncertainty for potential transmission developers 
and make it difficult for developers to secure financing, obtain necessary approvals and 
permits, and recover costs from ratepayers. 
2. Reliability Concerns 
Grid reliability depends on the transmission operator’s ability to balance load (i.e. 
energy demand) and resource availability (i.e. generation) within the transmission system 
at all times. The National Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC) recently issued an 
Initial Reliability Review of the CPP, which expressed concerns that the rule could 
compromise the reliability of the U.S. power grid.178 NERC’s concerns are premised on 
the understanding that baseload resources inherently promote grid reliability and stability 
by providing stable energy output to satisfy consumer energy demand. Variable 
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renewable resources, such as wind or solar power, generally cannot adjust their output to 
reflect changes in demand. Because grid operators must ensure that power levels in the 
grid remain in balance at all times, managing variable renewable resources can be a 
challenge. 
Changes in the size or location of available generating resources make it difficult 
for grid operators to maintain balance on the system. NERC’s Initial Reliability Review 
warned that implementation of the proposed CPP may strain the grid’s “Essential 
Reliability Services,” which are necessary to maintain balance between supply and 
demand.179 These services include 1) generation and load balancing; 2) voltage stability; 
and 3) frequency response. In the western grid, baseload coal plants help maintain voltage 
stability within an acceptable range and respond to changes in frequency following 
sudden losses of generation or load. Coal retirements in the region will reduce availability 
of these reliability services. At the same time, increases in variable renewable generation 
may require additional ramping of existing baseload resources, which could impose an 
extra strain on existing resources. 
The coal retirements called for under the proposed CPP may impose short-term 
reliability constraints on the western grid, and increased deployment of variable 
renewable resources will initially strain the flexibility of the grid. However, western states 
can mitigate these challenges through a coordinated, strategic effort to modernize the 
grid. 
B. The Solutions: Modernizing the Grid 
By promoting strategic transmission development, optimizing grid operations, and 
deploying advanced technologies, western states can increase the capacity and efficiency 
of the grid and effectively integrate large amounts of renewable energy onto the system. 
These investments will enable the west to transition from coal-fired power to renewable 
power without sacrificing grid reliability, stability, or flexibility. 
Western states can incentivize strategic interstate transmission development by 
implementing comprehensive transmission planning policies, coordinating siting 
requirements, and revising cost allocation methods to incentivize optimal regional 
development. First, states and transmission providers should engage in coordinated 
planning to identify both new and existing transmission facilities that can meet the 
region’s needs under the CPP.180 If this planning process identifies a need for new 
transmission facilities, planners should prioritize development in areas that provide the 
greatest access to high-quality renewable resources. Second, regulators should establish 
a uniform, streamlined process for siting, approving, and constructing interstate 
transmission lines. Third, regulators should establish cost allocation mechanisms to 
apportion transmission costs fairly among all beneficiaries.181 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 2, 18.   
 180. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Order 1000 directs each public utility 
transmission provider to participate in a regional transmission planning process that produces a regional 
transmission plan. Order 1000, supra note 61.  
 181. FERC’s Order 1000 also requires the regional planning process to establish a regional cost 
allocation method that allocates the costs of new regional or interregional transmission facilities among the 
facility’s beneficiaries “in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with the estimated benefits of that 
facility in each of the transmission planning regions.” Id. at 589. 
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Western states can effectively integrate high levels of renewable energy onto the 
grid without compromising reliability by optimizing grid operations, implementing 
advanced technologies, and adopting regional market-based mechanisms to increase 
transmission efficiency. First, western states can optimize grid operations to balance 
increasingly variable loads. This entails promoting geographically diverse resource 
development, improving forecasting processes, implementing intra-hour scheduling, 
improving reserve sharing, and enabling dynamic transfers between balancing areas. 
Second, western states can deploy advanced technologies to increase transmission 
capacity on existing lines. These technologies include smart grid-enabled demand 
response, dynamic line rating systems, and increased deployment of energy storage, 
distributed generation, and non-variable renewable resources. Finally, western states can 
explore regional market-based approaches, such as Energy Imbalance Markets, that may 
allow more efficient use of existing transmission by providing real-time access to unused 
transmission capacity across the region. 
C. Conclusion 
Implementing the CPP will present a number of challenges for the western grid, yet 
it also provides an opportunity to modernize and optimize the grid to accommodate more 
sustainable energy resources. The grid is a highly interconnected system, and shifts in 
one state’s resource mix may cause reliability issues in other states. Therefore, if states 
choose to implement the CPP by themselves, the entire grid may suffer. Western states 
should instead work together in a cooperative, collaborative manner to preemptively 
address inevitable changes in the western resource mix. In doing so, states should 
strategically invest in facilities, technologies, and operational practices that strengthen 
the western grid as a whole and facilitate the transition to a clean, renewable energy 
sector. 
 
